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COMPETITION AND COMITY  
IN THE FRAGMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
William Thomas Worster* 
INTRODUCTION 
The international legal system encompasses a variety of legal norms, 
but the perceived increase in “fragmentation” of these norms has recently 
been seen as a problem for the system as a whole.1 A few notable cases 
have highlighted the difficulties of a variety of tribunals reaching contra-
dictory results. One example is the direct conflict between the decision of 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Nicaragua case2 and the 
decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via (“ICTY”) in the Tadić case.3 In Tadić, the ICTY took the position 
that the “effective control” test, as formulated by the ICJ for determining 
whether a foreign State is responsible for an internal civil war, was too 
demanding.4 Instead, the ICTY held that the foreign State need only have 
had “a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions 
of the military group.”5 Interestingly, the ICTY did not suggest that this 
test is lex specialis for international individual criminal responsibility, 
but, rather, that the ICJ’s “effective control” test should be displaced  
entirely.6 
This conflict between the ICJ and the ICTY is hardly isolated.7 There 
is a perception that “courts in various countries are increasingly dissatis-
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 1. For a commentator’s negative portrayal of “fragmentation,” see Gerhard Hafner, 
Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
849, 849–50 (2004). 
 2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nic. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 64–65, ¶ 115 
(June 27). 
 3. Prosec. v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 116–45 (July 15, 1999). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. ¶ 137, at 59. 
 6. Id. 
 7. For example, the MOX Plant litigation comprises of a number of cases brought by 
Ireland against the United Kingdom regarding a nuclear reprocessing plant; these cases 
were litigated in several different fora and, notably, involved a conflict of jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., MOX Plant (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001); 
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fied with traditional rules [for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction and 
norms, considering them to be] inadequate in a modern, globalizing 
world.”8 Consequently, many writers have suggested forms of increased 
comity among international tribunals in order to combat the problems 
associated with fragmentation; indeed, locating harmonies among inter-
national legal regimes within a coherent international legal system ap-
pears to be the dominant trend.9 The proposals of Joost Pauwelyn10 and 
Yuval Shany,11 as well as to some degree the work of the International 
Law Commission (“ILC”) on fragmentation,12 are characteristic of the 
comity solution. Yet these perspectives dismiss, or at the very least, 
largely overlook, the benefits of competition among international tribun-
als. The international legal system need not identically reproduce a  
                                                                                                             
MOX Plant (No. 3) (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 1187 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2003) [hereinafter PCA 
Mox Plant Case No. 3]; Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Art. 9 of the 
OSPAR Convention (Final Award) (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 118 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2003). 
See also Nikolaos Lavranos, The Mox Plant and Ijzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court is 
the Supreme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 223 (2006) (discussing the need for a 
hierarchy amongst international courts and tribunals in order to avoid the fragmentation 
of international law). 
 8. Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 567, 586 
(2003). See also Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 573, 574–75 (2005) (arguing that fragmentation is caused by treaty conflicts and 
that a new approach should be established to resolve these conflicts). 
 9. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: 
The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 216 (2005) (“The most promising ap-
proach is to establish a set of common principles meant to harmonize the procedural 
means by which national courts adjudicate grave human rights violations.”). 
 10. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) [hereinafter 
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT]; Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: Internation-
al Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903 (2004) [herei-
nafter Pauwelyn, Bridging]; Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?: Dispute 
Settlement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with 
the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TR. 231 (2004) [hereinafter  
Pauwelyn, Going Global]. 
 11. See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS (2002); Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Con-
flicts Between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
835 (2005). 
 12. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [herei-
nafter ILC, July 18 Rep.]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of In-
ternational Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Kosken-
niemi) [hereinafter ILC, Apr. 13 Rep.]. 
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domestic legal system, even if it were possible to do so. If we accept con-
tradictions and disparities in different tribunals’ conclusions as inherent 
in and perhaps even beneficial to international law, then conflicts related 
to fragmentation are not so objectionable. Competition among tribunals 
can itself serve as the coherence of the international legal system, albeit 
not in the unitary, constitutional form of harmonized norms that some 
may desire. 
The argument that international tribunals should consider embracing 
competition among themselves proceeds in three stages. Part I discusses 
comity as a solution to conflicts emerging from fragmentation, in par-
ticular, the work of Joost Pauwelyn, Yuval Shany, and the ILC. Part II 
observes the reality of competition among tribunals, specifically discuss-
ing the viewpoints of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Yves Dezalay, and Bryant 
Garth. Part III assesses the drawbacks and benefits of competition, con-
cluding that competition among tribunals can result in constructive  
diversity, rather than destructive fragmentation. International justice can 
be realized best not by developing new forms of comity or attempting to 
politically replace one regime with another, but, rather, by accepting the 
diversity of norms and tribunals in the system and allowing them to be 
subject to a kind of natural selection. 
I. COMITY AS A SOLUTION 
In weighing the benefits of increased comity and competition, the first 
inquiry is: what is meant by “comity”? As one scholar has noted, 
“[D]espite ubiquitous invocation of the doctrine of comity, its meaning is 
surprisingly elusive.”13 Comity can mean anything from the foundation 
of international law to mere courtesy, from rules of jurisdiction to the 
discretion to decline a case.14 
An example of comity serving as a rule of respect for the sovereignty 
and competence of another legal actor can be found in the MOX Plant 
cases.15 In these cases, the tribunal formed under the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea suspended its proceedings to provide the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) an opportunity to reach a decision on a pending 
application concerning issues similar to those the tribunal was confront-
ing. The tribunal reasoned that that ECJ might be better suited to answer 
the questions at hand.16 There was no immediate threat of reaching a con-
flicting decision, just an initial conflict of jurisdiction. The tribunal  
                                                                                                             
 13. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1991). 
 14. See generally id., at 44–54, 70–77. 
 15. PCA Mox Plant Case No. 3, supra note 7, ¶ 28. 
 16. Id. ¶ 29. 
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explained that the stay was required by the “mutual respect and comity 
that should [exist] between judicial institutions” deciding on rights and 
obligations as between States, and entrusted with the function of assist-
ing States in the peaceful settlement of disputes between them.17 
A distinction can be made between a deferral under comity out of  
respect for another judicial body and a deferral under comity out of re-
spect for a State generally.18 Some legal systems, however, have denied 
that comity is practiced out of international respect for another sovereign, 
instead explaining that it arises from a demand for substantive justice,19 
which may encompass the principles of diplomatic or sovereign immuni-
ty,20 or the recognition of foreign court judgments.21 For the purposes of 
this Article, the important distinction is whether the discretion exercised 
is one of legal principle or courtesy.  
Comity is known in both common law and civil law countries.22 In 
general, common law systems practice comity as discretion,23 whereas 
civil law systems are inclined to refute that comity is discretionary,  
arguing that exercising discretion would be an abuse of judicial power.24 
While civil law courts may reach similar results as their common law 
counterparts, they do so under legally binding principles, rather than by 
mere courtesy.25 These principles of comity in civil law countries gener-
ally tend to be seen as principles of binding public international law,26 a 
notion common law countries generally reject.27 Common law countries, 
however, have historically maintained that the distinction between public 
and private comity is false.28 Hersch Lauterpacht, for example, has de-
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. ¶ 28. 
 18. See Upendra Baxi, Geographies of Injustice, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
197, 205 (Scott Craig ed., 2001). 
 19. See Paul, supra note 13, at 44–54. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 2 (citing MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 
(1988)). 
 22. See id. at 44–54. 
 23. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersec-
tion Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982). 
 24. See Paul, supra note 13, at 33. See also Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 
E.C.R. I-1383 (criticizing the forum non conveniens principle as incompatible with Euro-
pean regulation). 
 25. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003 
(2006); Paul, supra note 13, at 32. 
 26. See Paul, supra note 13, at 28. 
 27. See Maier, supra note 23. 
 28. See Paul, supra note 9, at 25–26 (discussing how leading European scholars in the 
nineteenth century did not see a distinction between the private and the public and “ar-
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nied comity to be a binding principle of public international law, and in-
stead argued it to be a matter of respect among sovereigns.29 
Thus, it is clear that there is no simple definition for comity and that 
because of these differences between legal cultures, the criteria for in-
voking comity vary widely among national jurisdictions. Some believe a 
tribunal must examine the interests of the forum while keeping in mind 
its role as a facilitator of interfora questions and resolver of conflicts 
within the international legal system.30 Others criticize considering inter-
state political relations and demand that a tribunal simply apply its law 
without regard to these issues.31   
Despite the difficulty of defining comity, it appears to be a way for in-
jecting international politics directly into a tribunal’s considerations that 
is separate from the “mechanical” act of legal interpretation.32 Given the 
flexible and broad notion of comity, it might best be described “[a]s a 
bridge . . . meant to expand the role of public policy, public law, and in-
ternational politics in [the judiciary].”33 The results of applying comity or 
quasi-comity principles of law can be similar, notwithstanding various 
interpretations; a court uses these principles to defer to another sovereign 
regarding certain issues, but not others, based on a balance struck be-
tween competing policies.34 As a result, any use or advocacy of comity 
must be an assertion of some extralegal policy choices.  
                                                                                                             
gued in varying degrees that private international law derived from public international 
law,” but noting that in the United States, a private/public distinction did exist.) 
 29. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–46 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 
1970); Hersch Lauterpacht, Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Jurisdiction Over 
Aliens, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 330, 331 (1945). 
 30. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 429, 478 n.193 (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: 
Proliferation, Fragmentation and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International 
Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273 (2006). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Consti-
tutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute 
Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 753, 774–79 (1999) (“In international 
economic law, ‘cooperation among international courts’ has been recognized as an im-
portant tool for promoting an international ‘community of law.’”). 
 31. See Maier, supra note 23, at 288. 
 32. See Paul, supra note 13, at 54–56. 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. See id. at 2 (“Comity is a ready explanation for much of what courts do in public 
and private international law. In the name of comity, U.S. courts often recognize and 
enforce foreign judgments or limit domestic jurisdiction to hear claims or apply law, even 
where foreign law is contrary to U.S. law or policy. Guided by notions of comity, courts 
consider competing foreign and domestic interests.”). 
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Regardless of its nature, comity is often conceived as part of a coherent 
field of international law.35 One’s perspective on the nature of the inter-
national legal system informs not only how comity is applied, but also 
how it is best applied. If one sees the international legal system as a co-
herent whole (or a system with the objective of forming a coherent 
whole), then one’s policy choice is to place emphasis on the integrity of 
the system. After all, comity is a way for one legal actor to defer to 
another.36 However, if one does not see a coherent whole, but rather,  
independent, competing legal actors, a system “mostly of erratic blocks 
and elements as well as different partial systems,”37 what kind of comity 
should be exercised? 
A. Joost Pauwelyn’s View 
Joost Pauwelyn has made an effort to bring together public internation-
al legal rules while still recognizing the differences among nations and 
their respective freedom to refuse to defer to others’ rules. He draws 
general conclusions for international tribunals from the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”). Finding that the WTO must contemplate the entire 
corpus of international law,38 he creates the metaphor of “inter-connected 
islands”: legal orders, of which the WTO is one, that are self-contained 
to some degree, but also regard each other through their connections in 
general international law.39 With this expression, he describes a fairly 
coherent international legal system respected by tribunals, regardless of 
their specialty; although they may conflict over jurisdiction, they do not 
seek to impose differing legal norms.40 
Pauwelyn defines conflict more broadly than two situations demanding 
two distinct outcomes. For him, certainly, the notion of a conflict  
includes situations in which one outcome demands a violation of the  
                                                                                                             
 35. But see id. at 8–9 (“[T]he peculiar strain [of comity] that developed in the classic-
al doctrine of comity in the United States resulted in part from the incoherence of the 
doctrine itself. This incoherence is both traceable to, and well represented by, the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Hilton v. Guyot, which is the most commonly cited statement of 
comity in U.S. law.”). 
 36. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 579. 
 37. Hafner, supra note 1, at 850. See also William Burke-White, International Legal 
Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 964 (2004) (discussing the fragmented nature of in-
ternational law discourse). 
 38. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 440 (“The thrust of [this] book [is] to 
portray WTO law as part of the wider corpus of public international law.”). 
 39. See Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10. 
 40. See id. 
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other,41 but his definition also includes situations involving a conflict 
between an obligation and a right,42 which is not a particularly narrow 
reading of the meaning of conflict. He also finds it important to distin-
guish between a direct, facial conflict of norms and a conflict of norms 
that arises only from the interpretive and implementation process.43 
Having identified the kinds of conflicts he will address, Pauwelyn then 
proposes rules for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction and norms by refer-
ring to already existing rules of public international law. For example, he 
looks to explicit conflicts clauses, lex posterior and lex specialis rules, 
and the laws on state responsibility.44 In other work, he discusses forum 
non conveniens, res judicata, abuse of process, and lis alibi pendens45 as 
additional existing methods in international law to resolve conflicts of 
jurisdiction. Some conflicts result in the invalidity of one of the norms; 
others result in the priority of one norm over the other.46 A tribunal may 
only find a true conflict if the usual methods of international law for 
dealing with conflicts fail. 
One argument against such an approach—namely, using the WTO as a 
guideline for other tribunals—is that the WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (“DSU”) specifically accepts general international law as an 
interpretive tool,47 whereas other bodies may not. In particular, ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals, or national courts hearing disputes with an international 
character, do not necessarily accept the entire corpus of general interna-
tional law.48 Although one could argue that the DSU’s endorsement of 
                                                                                                             
 41. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 175–76 (“Essentially, two norms are, 
therefore, in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a 
breach of the other.”). 
 42. Id. at 171–72, 178–88. 
 43. Id. at 176. 
 44. Id. at 327–43. 
 45. See Pauwelyn, Going Global, supra note 10. 
 46. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 178–88. 
 47. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, art. 3 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.— Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Mar. 20, 1996) 
(holding that the DSU Article 3.2 requires WTO agreements to be interpreted in accor-
dance “with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”). 
 48. For a discussion on ad hoc tribunals, see, for example, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN 
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 127 (4th ed., 
2004). “The reference to ‘such rules of international law as may be applicable’ (as, for 
example, in the Washington Convention), or to ‘the relevant principles of international 
law’ (as in the Channel Tunnel Treaty) [helps] remind us that it is not the whole corpus 
of law, but only certain specific rules of law that are likely to be relevant in any given 
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general international law as an interpretive guideline49 suggests that the 
rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Con-
vention”) would not apply without it, the contrary argument could also 
be made: the DSU codifies what should have been understood before its 
formation. In fact, the WTO Panel in Korea—Measures Affecting Gov-
ernment Procurement stated that the purpose of the DSU provision was 
to resolve the issues stemming from the pre-WTO era when adjudicators 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) failed to 
follow the customary rules of treaty interpretation properly.50  
Moreover, the WTO’s acceptance of general international law is 
phrased in terms of using the law to guide the interpretation of the WTO 
Agreements, not to impose additional obligations independent from, or 
superior to, the Agreements.51 It is clear from the terms of the DSU itself 
that general international law is a valid interpretive tool, but the DSU 
does not indicate that non-WTO obligations may be transported into the 
WTO context.52 There is no support in the text of the WTO Agreements 
for applying a non-WTO defense against a WTO obligation. If Pauwelyn 
finds that such defenses may be entertained, there would appear to be no 
similar prohibition against a WTO tribunal hearing the merits of a non-
WTO claim as well. Furthermore, as Bruno Simma has observed, “[T]he 
exclusion or modification through a ‘self-contained regime’ or ‘normal’ 
secondary rules which leads to a ‘softening’ of the legal consequences of 
wrongful acts should not easily be presumed.”53 Accordingly, Pau-
welyn’s conclusion that the WTO should be a model for international 
tribunals generally may be unwarranted. 
An additional critique of Pauwelyn’s perspective is that integrating 
WTO law into substantive nontrade international law may go against the 
intent of the parties to the WTO and may be counterproductive to achiev-
ing the human rights and environmental objectives that Pauwelyn  
appears to endorse. The parties to the WTO presumably negotiated the 
Agreements with the intent of establishing a self-contained regime,  
allowing the terms of the Agreements to be interpreted in the light of 
                                                                                                             
dispute.” Id. For a discussion on national courts, see, for example, Medellin v. Texas, 128 
S.Ct. 1346, 1361–62 (2008) (holding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
though it was adopted as a treaty, was not incorporated into U.S. law by implementing 
legislation, which would provide a mechanism for direct enforcement). 
 49. See DSU, supra note 47, art. 3.2, at 1227. 
 50. Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, 
WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000). 
 51. DSU, supra note 47, art. 3.2, at 1227. 
 52. Id. art. 1(1), at 1227. 
 53. Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 111, 
135 (1985). 
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general international law, while refusing to grant competence to hear 
non-WTO law matters, as defenses or otherwise.54 The political trade-
offs of such negotiation should not be dismissed lightly: “by establishing 
‘self-contained regimes,’ States contract out of the general rules on the 
consequences of treaty violations on the expectation that these regimes 
will work to their mutual benefit.”55 The parties may have specifically 
intended certain outcomes, either by limiting the competence of the or-
ganization or even by making the organization entirely ineffective.56 This 
perspective does not imply that nontrade goals are irrelevant for the de-
velopment of WTO law, since the negotiators of the WTO Agreements 
could have intended trade liberalization as one vehicle for reducing po-
verty and otherwise improving global welfare57 (even though it might 
impact the environment adversely). Moreover, Pauwelyn’s proposal risks 
undermining the WTO regime. If decisions are based on agreements  
outside the WTO’s specific competence, they may be less likely to be 
complied with, as Member Parties may view those decisions as less legi-
timate and may bring their claims to the WTO less frequently. 
One of the fundamental points Pauwelyn makes is the right to “con-
tract out” of existing norms while still maintaining respect for interna-
tional law already in force, even if a negotiated treaty does not.58 This 
deference includes the obligation to apply pre-existing norms in a forum, 
but within the limits of the tribunal’s competence. For example, the 
WTO must apply other norms as defenses, although it is not competent 
to enforce the norms themselves.59 A possible illustration of the WTO 
applying this kind of rule might be Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s proposal 
for the WTO to acknowledge its members’ human rights obligations.60 
                                                                                                             
 54. Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context: The Integration of International  
Human Rights and Environmental Law in the Dispute Settlement Process, in THE WTO 
AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 143–45 (Giorgio  
Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). See also 
WORLD TRADE ORG. INFO. & MEDIA RELATIONS DIV., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO (3d ed. 
2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. 
 55. Simma, supra note 53, at 136. 
 56. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 469. 
 57. See generally, e.g., Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, Importing Equality?: 
The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 540 
(2004) (examining the impact of globalization on gender discrimination in manufacturing 
industries). 
 58. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 37–40, 212–18. 
 59. See id. at 228–36. 
 60. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining 
and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29, 70 (L. 
Burgi et al. eds., 2005). 
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Interestingly, Pauwelyn’s conclusion is that, in a conflict, many interna-
tional legal norms may result in the nonapplication of WTO law.61  
Essentially, he believes that since all international legal norms apply (un-
less contracted out), there really is no conflict.62 The difficulty with this 
argument is that, while States may “contract out,” it is not entirely clear 
that the WTO Agreements establishing the rules of trade liberalization 
“contracted out” of the rules otherwise governing the interactions of 
States. While it is assumed that the rules of general international law  
apply before all tribunals unless specifically exempted from application, 
just the opposite could be argued: the WTO is a tribunal whose compe-
tence is deliberately limited to the WTO Agreements.63  
This argument is based on Pauwelyn’s interpretation of the WTO obli-
gations as “reciprocal,” rather than “integral,” as might be expected in a 
multilateral treaty.64 In contrast, though, Pauwelyn interprets other inter-
national obligations as truly “integral” and thus owed erga omnes.65 
Conveniently, “reciprocal” obligations may be modified between the  
parties, regardless of other multilateral partners’ opinions, whereas 
“integral” obligations may not.66 The happy result is that “integral” trea-
ties concluded before the WTO Agreements, such as some human rights 
treaties, remain in force and are not modified by the WTO Agreements. 
However, “integral” treaties concluded after the WTO Agreements can 
modify those obligations. This is problematic because although the WTO 
tribunals may issue decisions aimed at the withdrawal of the offending 
provisions, they do not have the authority to order their withdrawal; in-
stead, compensation may be awarded if a State chooses to continue main-
                                                                                                             
 61. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 490–92. See also Pauwelyn, Bridging, 
supra note 10, at 911. 
 62. Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10, at 915–16 (“Especially before a particular 
court or tribunal, it is important to include all international law binding between the par-
ties as part of the applicable law, even if the jurisdiction of the adjudicator is limited to a 
given treaty (say, WTO covered agreements). If all courts and tribunals follow this ap-
proach, it would mean that, although they may have jurisdiction to examine different 
claims, in doing so they would apply the same law. Hence, in theory, no conflicts should 
arise.”). 
 63. See, e.g., European Communities—Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain 
Poultry Products, ¶ 79, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998) (adopted July 23, 1998) (hold-
ing that a separate bilateral agreement between the parties was not a WTO agreement 
within the WTO’s competence). 
 64. See PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 69–88. For an overview of the dis-
tinction between “reciprocal” and “integral,” see id. at 52–88. 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 74–75 (characterizing the Genocide Convention and European 
Communities’ treaties as “integral”). 
 66. See id. at 53. 
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taining those measures.67 Such possibility demonstrates that States have 
some freedom to violate the WTO Agreements, albeit in violation of a 
moral obligation to comply.68 This interpretation is also troublesome be-
cause conflicts between tribunals’ jurisdiction and jurisprudence might 
be subject to a classification of the conflict, regardless of whether the 
obligation in question is “integral” or “reciprocal,” or whether it is a pro-
hibition or a right. Although Pauwelyn observes that the interpretation of 
treaties evolves,69 he does not acknowledge that the classification of 
norms might similarly evolve.  
An even larger problem with Pauwelyn’s view is his assumption that 
existing rules of public international law (which provide options for 
managing conflicts) apply to certain kinds of conflicts. As previously 
discussed, even this concept is plagued with a variety of interpretations. 
In cases of “inherent normative conflicts,”70 there may not be agreement 
on the normative force of explicit conflicts clauses, and on lex posterior 
and specialis rules, among other conflict resolution techniques.  
Curiously, Pauwelyn also acknowledges the general benefit of decen-
tralized competition, noting that “multiple proceedings may actually be 
helpful as long as each tribunal stays within the limits of its jurisdiction 
and defers to the other tribunal when it comes to deciding matters falling 
within that tribunal’s jurisdiction,”71 as “different conclusions based on 
the same law . . . may even have positive side effects: [t]hrough competi-
tion the best interpretation is likely to surface.”72 However, his general 
approach is not one of true competition among tribunals, but of promot-
ing a constitutionalizing process.  
In sum, Pauwelyn’s version of comity appears to be a legal one in the 
civil law tradition, not an overtly discretionary pursuit of policy objec-
tives. In reality, however, Pauwelyn is advocating for the primacy of 
human rights obligations over WTO law as a political end in itself, not as 
the result of the objective application of rules of interpretation. He pro-
poses a rather radical restructuring of the relationships among interna-
tional tribunals, as well as a radical restructuring of their competence, 
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although he relies on existing rules of international law, selecting certain 
legal objectives such as effectiveness, and techniques such as lex post-
erior. By selecting objectives and techniques that do not appear to reflect 
policy choices, he brings extra-WTO issues into the fold and constitutio-
nalizes the WTO within the international legal system.  
B. Yuval Shany’s View   
Yuval Shany also recommends a form of comity to increase the effec-
tiveness of international dispute settlement.73 He suggests mechanisms 
for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction, not conflicts of obligations. These 
mechanisms include increased comity (i.e., the conservative exercise of 
jurisdiction based on respect) and the harmonization of conflict rules.74 
Whereas Pauwelyn offers pre-existing rules of public international law to 
resolve normative conflicts, Shany transports private international law’s 
jurisdictional conflict rules into the sphere of public international law. 
These jurisdictional conflict rules embrace concepts such as forum non 
conveniens, res judicata, and lis alibi pendens.75 In later work, Shany also 
proposes abus de droit to prevent parties from taking advantage of alter-
nate fora in bad faith, by forum shopping or otherwise.76 Although Shany 
acknowledges that various legal actors are independent of one another, 
he, like Pauwelyn, views international law as a coherent system whose 
dangerous conflicts need only be “solved” by clear rules.  
One problem with Shany’s analysis is that aspects of comity, especial-
ly the concepts of forum non conveniens and bad faith, are highly discre-
tionary.77 Thus, they are a rather unpredictable tool for constructing an 
international legal system that is supposed to be able to resolve conflicts 
predictably. Shany identifies where consistent practice can be found for 
discretionary policy, such as with lis alibi pendens and res judicata, but 
also notes where it cannot.78 Although he concedes that competition 
among fora may develop better, more harmonious policies (just as Pau-
welyn appears to do), his definition of competing fora is narrow. Shany 
                                                                                                             
 73. See generally SHANY, supra note 11. 
 74. Id. at 266, 271. 
 75. See id. at 269–70. 
 76. See Shany, supra note 11, at 849. 
 77. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why 
Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 241 (2007). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947) (“The 
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its 
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. . 
. . [T]he doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts.”). 
 78. SHANY, supra note 11, at 269–71. 
2008] COMPETITION AND COMITY 131 
argues that tribunals are only in competition if they are likely to produce 
similar results on the same issue.79 Yet, the “lis alibi pendens rule [and 
the res judicata requirement] . . . [do] not apply to courts of different na-
tional, regional, and worldwide legal systems unless such a prohibition 
has been explicitly provided.”80   
Despite Shany’s examples, increasing the degree of discretion for tri-
bunals is an unlikely political goal. For example, as José Alvarez has 
observed:  
At least some of the [North American Free Trade Agreement] parties 
appear to be having second thoughts about the scope of discretion that 
they have handed over to [International Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes] arbitrators and appear to be turning to inter-
pretative statements ‘to take the power of decision away.’81 
Judge Guillaume might add that in order to apply norms drawn from 
national courts, including lis alibi pendens and res judicata, the interna-
tional legal system might also need to adopt rules of court hierarchy, as 
national court systems have done.82 Shany acknowledges that until more 
harmonized rules are developed, his conflict resolution policies appear 
very political. Many commentators have observed that tribunals are often 
very conscious of the appearance that they create law.83 It seems strange 
for Shany to propose the development of rules by tribunals for the sake 
of legitimacy and effectiveness while worrying that the rules he proposes 
might appear to have been politically developed.    
In contrast to Pauwelyn, Shany’s version of comity is more discretio-
nary and more overtly policy laden, but, like Pauwelyn, his proposal is 
actually more radical than it might appear at first glance. Shany avoids 
being too controversial by limiting his scope to jurisdiction.84 Furthermore, 
although tribunals might not be directly contemplating the substance of 
other self-contained regimes, they might reach the same outcomes by 
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simply sending cases away to competing regimes in a less regulated, dis-
cretionary atmosphere.  
C. The View of the International Law Commission 
The work of the ILC on the subject of fragmentation also lends some 
insight to this discussion of comity as a solution to the perceived problems 
with fragmentation. In the preliminary report on the matter, Martti 
Koskenniemi states: “[t]here is no single legislative will behind internation-
al law. Treaties and custom come about as a result of conflicting motives 
and objectives—they are ‘bargains’ and ‘package-deals’ and often result 
from spontaneous reactions to events in the environment.”85 Nonetheless, 
he concludes, “International law is a legal system . . . . There are mea-
ningful relationships between [norms] . . . [and i]t is a generally accepted 
principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to 
the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of 
compatible obligations.”86 
However, Koskenniemi argues elsewhere that any attempt to provide 
for a coherent international law system is largely a struggle of competing 
international law perspectives seeking to gain dominance over interna-
tional law as a whole.87 In light of this, it must be emphasized that the 
ILC’s use of the word “system” means only “that the various decisions, 
rules and principles of which the law consists do not appear not random-
ly related to each other . . . [and that] there is seldom disagreement that it 
is one of the tasks of legal reasoning to establish [relationships between 
them].”88  
Other authors also acknowledge this problem of competing legal pers-
pectives, but simply argue for the particular values that their preferred 
regime offers.89 The ILC itself recognizes this concern to some degree, 
mainly by questioning whether coherence in the international legal sys-
tem is necessary for its own sake. While the ILC sees value in predicta-
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bility, legal security, and equality, it does admit, “Coherence is . . . a 
formal and abstract virtue. For a legal system that is regarded in some 
respects as unjust or unworkable, no added value is brought by the fact of 
its being coherently so.”90  
One of the important insights in the ILC’s work is its interpretation of 
conflict, which distinguishes between “conflicts within a regime” and 
“conflicts across regimes.”91 The Vienna Convention sees conflicts as 
subject-matter issues,92 but the ILC disagrees with this approach. For the 
ILC, conflict cannot merely be a matter of classifying subject matter, 
since no accepted classification scheme exists.93 The ILC favors Pau-
welyn’s broad definition of conflict, which encompasses frustration of 
purpose, over the narrow definition of two norms demanding incompati-
ble results.94 In addition, the ILC supports Pauwelyn’s perspective that 
“[w]hile the [DSU] limits the jurisdiction to claims which arise under the 
WTO covered agreements only, there is no explicit provision identifying 
the scope of applicable law.”95  
Significantly, the ILC concludes that fragmentation is not a threat to 
the international system, because whether conflicts reflect fragmentation 
or diversity “lie[s] in the eye of the beholder.”96 Any complications that 
ensue are not “legal-technical ‘mistakes,’” but rather, a natural conse-
quence of the way the legal order works in a pluralistic system that  
accommodates a variety of values.97 Admittedly, the ILC’s work only 
discusses substantive conflicts, not the institutional conflicts that frag-
mentation also poses.98 As a result, the ILC looks to the Vienna Conven-
tion, other rules of general international law such as lex specialis, lex 
posterior, and jus cogens, and the notion that international obligations 
may develop to resolve conflicts.99 These techniques position various 
legal values against one another using a language that all lawyers can 
agree on and understand, thereby bringing legal closure to disputes. Per-
haps such closure is what V.S. Mani contemplated when he wrote that 
international adjudication “endeavors to resolve the dispute—or at least 
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disposes it off from the juridical plane,”100 or what Sir Robert Jennings 
meant when he distinguished between a dispute generally and the legal 
or justiciable aspects of the dispute.101 Thus, whether we call the dynam-
ics of the international legal system “fragmentation” or “diversity” does 
not mean that lawyers cannot talk to each other and reach closure on the 
legal aspects of a dispute. 
The ILC’s work primarily focuses, like that of Pauwelyn, on existing 
rules to resolve conflicts. However, where Pauwelyn might propose a 
supposedly mechanical technique for definitively establishing superior 
norms without regard for the morality of the norms (although conve-
niently human rights norms do triumph), the ILC finds that the nature of 
the dispute resolution process in the international legal system is not so 
apolitical102 and that the perspective of each regime must be to regard its 
own norms as lex specialis.103 While Pauwelyn might argue that there 
could be solutions to conflicts that a tribunal may discover, the ILC 
might argue that a solution does not exist prior to the dispute, but, rather, 
is formed through the process of assessing differing values and seeking 
closure.104 In any event, neither party generally finds conflicts to be a 
threat to a system of international law perceived as integrated. 
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II. COMPETITION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COMITY  
Competition is, of course, not the polar opposite of comity. Rather, it is 
a trend that can pull in the opposite direction, but not necessarily so. We 
might even consider competition as one kind of comity, that is, one kind 
of relationship among legal actors. If the international legal system is 
composed of independent legal actors, then fostering their independence 
may support the system. With each of these actors operating indepen-
dently and in competition with each other, the problems associated with 
fragmentation can be effectively resolved. 
Jan Dalhuisen has noted that 
[i]n situations where the conflicting interests are such that there is  
competition between the international commercial and financial order 
and a state legal order, state courts in the countries most directly  
concerned will be mindful of their state’s position, but even interna-
tional arbitrators or state courts in other states may not be indifferent to 
this competition, although the outcome may not be the same.105 
John Dugard has observed that the ICJ was less frequently seized of 
disputes after its decision in the early South West Africa case, which  
emphasized more formalistic interpretive techniques, and then it success-
fully attracted disputants back to its facilities after shifting to a more  
purposive analysis in the Namibia case.106  
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao has added: 
Another stated reason for the formation of new tribunals is disenchant-
ment with the decisions of the ICJ, but this explanation too is not a sig-
nificant factor. After all, disenchantment with outcomes is not confined 
to the ICJ or to judicial tribunals in general; it is a feature common to 
most permanent institutional bodies.107  
In addition, the ICJ apparently sought to accommodate the United 
States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine case by constituting a special 
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chamber of specific judges, due to the threat of the parties leaving the 
court for an ad hoc tribunal.108 
This reality of competition should not be overstated, since parties are 
not entirely free to choose any judicial or quasi-judicial forum for dispute 
resolution. However, this does not diminish the pressures of competition 
on tribunals of all stripes, and not just pressure from other judicial  
bodies. It has even been observed that an institution such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (“ICC”) “will need to compete, in highly charged 
political environments, to fill its docket.”109 The apparent reluctance of 
the U.N. Security Council, Secretary General, and Member States to en-
force the arrest warrants issued for certain indicted Sudanese individuals 
could suggest that the ICC is losing political influence as international 
actors seek alternate methods to resolve the dispute within the Sudan.110 
In selecting a dispute resolution forum, there may be structural limita-
tions (i.e., treaty language), a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdic-
tion, or a lack of competence that limits the options for a particular  
forum. Nonetheless, parties, as sovereign entities, may always seek to 
resolve their differences through mediation, ad hoc arbitration, or one of 
the many alternative methods, for example, simple negotiation.111 And, 
States often prefer judicial tribunals to nonjudicial, including preferring 
domestic processes to international.112 Accordingly, the existence of Al-
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ternate Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) generally is enough to bring about 
competition among tribunals. 
In addition to negotiation and other ADR methods, the structure and 
political nature of tribunals exerts competitive pressure. Observers have 
noted that the WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the 
ICJ are subject to intense political pressures such as the selection of fa-
vorable judges, bringing political cases to tribunals, and compliance with 
judgments113: “[p]olitics does not stop once a court is established and 
adjudication begins.”114 Thus, the pressures of competition can arise not 
only from direct conflicts of norms and jurisdiction, but also from the 
constitutive nature of tribunals and even the personal career objectives of 
the individual judges concerned. It must be recognized and accepted that 
various tribunals do compete with each other for legal authority, and that 
any effort to constitutionalize the international system, or otherwise es-
tablish norms for resolving conflicts, has a political result: the favoring 
of certain tribunals. 
A. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s View 
Anne-Marie Slaughter agrees that there is competition among courts, 
but her perspective is friendly. She denies a constitutional coherence to 
the international legal order,115 and presents instead a system of “fellow 
professionals in an endeavor that transcends national borders.”116 For 
Slaughter, competition is constructive: “[j]udges who are beginning to 
think of one another as participants in the same dispute resolution system 
are often less willing to defer to one another out of the comity of nations. 
. . . The result, paradoxically, is more dialogue and less deference.”117 
However, she posits that through this sort of competition, “a distinct doc-
trine of ‘judicial comity’ will emerge: a set of principles designed to 
guide courts in giving deference.”118 It is somewhat unclear if her version 
of comity is discretionary or more rule-based, since she elsewhere argues 
in favor of “constrained independence” where tribunals are limited only 
by “structural, political, and discursive mechanisms,”119 which she poses 
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in opposition to the theory that “the only effective international tribunals 
are ‘dependent’ [less ideological] tribunals.”120 Slaughter’s perspective 
suggests that her vision of comity is quite different from Pauwelyn’s. 
Slaughter presumes that through friendly competition, some kind of  
international law of comity (or similar constitutionalizing solution to  
address conflicts) will emerge. Slaughter’s theory assumes that conflicts 
are destructive and that, at some point, international law may be able to 
rid itself of conflicts. The reality is that conflicts are more likely to be a 
permanent fixture, but may serve a constructive purpose in themselves. 
B. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth’s View 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth extensively discuss tribunal competi-
tion in connection with ADR’s propensity to attract business121 and the 
diffusion of law into new jurisdictions.122 They are particularly interested 
in how certain laws compete with others to govern legal outcomes,123 and 
the spread of American norms, which have competed with and pushed 
aside European norms.124 In fact, the competition they see goes so far as 
to offer competing definitions of arbitration/mediation.125 Dezalay and 
Garth have also noted that the competitive atmosphere in international 
law has intensified, transporting considerations of the market into the 
law,126 and that in terms of maintaining legitimacy and social relevance, 
this might be a healthy updating of the law and legal dispute resolu-
tion.127 
Dezalay and Garth’s observations seem accurate. Like Slaughter, they 
acknowledge the reality of competition and acknowledge that it has nor-
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mative effects. Also like Slaughter, their observations are stated as fact 
(though not without a hint of sadness for the passing of the old order) and 
are emblematic of the new normative system supplanting the old. ADR 
has been, as a field, historically dominated by Europeans, and it is now 
becoming increasingly dominated by Americans. As such, Americans 
will bring their own norms with them, pushing out the older, European 
ones. Competition continuously produces newer, and possibly more rele-
vant and fair, norms. 
III. THE DRAWBACKS AND BENEFITS OF COMPETITION 
A. Drawbacks of Competition 
Competition among tribunals has led some to criticize tribunals or in-
dividual judges for making themselves attractive as decision makers,128 
and highlight the drawbacks posed to the international legal system. Fo-
rum shopping is almost always identified as one of the more serious 
threats, criticized for providing parties opportunities to select a tribunal 
based on “access to the court, the procedure followed, the court’s  
composition, . . . its power to make certain types of order[,] . . . [or] the 
case-law . . . [that] happens to be more favourable to certain doctrines, 
concepts[,] or interests.”129 More specifically, “[t]he particular proce-
dures involved may . . . influence the application of substantive domestic 
or foreign law and the outcome of disputes.”130 Also cited as drawbacks 
are parallel litigation (often linked to litigation costs),131 the development 
of a more litigious international environment,132 and a “risk of conflicting 
judgments,”133 especially by courts with differing expertise and compe-
tence.134 Even more grave, the fragmentation of the law could accelerate 
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and increase destabilizing forces, threatening the international rule of 
law135 and thereby endangering legal certainty itself.136 
B. Benefits of Competition 
These criticisms, leaning on a theory of a coherent international legal 
system, presuppose that competition has only drawbacks: they do not 
give due regard to potential benefits. What is problematic about a party 
forum shopping, especially a sovereign State that has constructed the 
very tribunal it now wishes to seize, even if it affects the kind of justice 
reached? As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann observes, “Forum shopping and 
multiple litigations have become frequent in the legally and institutional-
ly fragmented international law of human rights.”137 Petersmann contin-
ues by noting that  
[w]hereas forum shopping in private international commercial law may 
seriously inconvenience private parties attacked against their will in 
distant fora applying foreign law, respondent parties in intergovern-
mental litigation usually have the resources to defend themselves in  
international courts whose jurisdiction they have voluntarily accepted.138 
In fact, we might argue that forum shopping is, in essence, what States 
have always done when they have created new arbitral tribunals or 
claims commissions for disputes. Not content with the decisions or per-
haps even the kind of justice they might receive at one tribunal, States 
create others, ones they perceive to be more fair, often referring to them 
as possessing “better expertise” or as being “more specialized.”139 It can-
not be forgotten that in international law, as opposed to domestic legal 
systems, a tribunal only has jurisdiction by state consent.140 If forum 
shopping is considered a problem, then the solution would be to prohibit 
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States from creating any new tribunals, perhaps even ones on a bilateral 
or regional basis. This is not only a conceptually difficult task, but also 
practically impossible to accomplish.   
As for multiple litigations, Pauwelyn interestingly comments: 
[The burden of] adjudicating the same dispute before two different tri-
bunals does not necessarily amount to wasteful duplication. In case 
each of the two tribunals deals with clearly distinct matters—such as a 
WTO or [South African Development Community] panel dealing with 
trade-related claims and [International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea] 
with matters related to the law of the sea or conservation—multiple 
proceedings may actually be helpful as long as each tribunal stays with-
in the limits of its jurisdiction and defers to the other tribunal when it 
comes to deciding matters falling within that tribunal’s jurisdiction.141 
Accordingly, even if the pressures on a party to defend multiple suits 
were a valid concern, others have observed that it is already acceptable 
for persons to be subjected to parallel or conflicting laws as an inherent 
aspect of globalization.142  
Competition among tribunals might lead to better decisions. A court 
may not be required to follow another’s jurisprudence, but the risk of 
another forum reaching a contrary result and potentially embarrassing the 
tribunal might encourage a more careful weighing of issues. A tribunal 
may not be seized of a similar dispute again, and thus may not have the 
opportunity to refine its jurisprudence on a given issue; judges might also 
lose opportunities for career-advancing positions if their decisions come 
into disrepute. In addition, a State faced with truly conflicting decisions 
from two or more tribunals, that is, decisions requiring an act that 
breaches another obligation, must make a choice and violate one regime 
in order to follow the other. It is doubtful that any tribunal would want to 
be seen as imposing less important decisions that are less likely to be 
followed, and therefore, a tribunal may tailor its judgments to avoid forc-
ing a State to make such a decision. 
In the recent Kadi and Yusuf cases before the Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities (“Court of First Instance”), although no jus 
cogens concerns were held to be at issue, the court suggested that some 
form of conflict with the decisions of the U.N. Security Council might be 
possible over jus cogens issues, and that it could not defer to the Security 
Council in such a case.143 Since the issues did not rise to the level of jus 
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cogens, one might wonder why the Court of First Instance bothered to 
devote analysis to a potential conflict with the Security Council, and 
whether it was merely the court’s political assertion of the primacy of 
human rights norms. While on appeal to the ECJ, the Advocate General 
suggested that the ECJ could not defer to the Security Council’s com-
mand—a command that would demand a violation of human rights 
law—and the ECJ subsequently agreed with that opinion.144 Human 
rights campaigners might applaud the ECJ for remaining within its com-
petence and not giving decisive weight to Security Council decisions, but 
they might also decry the WTO for failing to step outside its competence 
to consider human rights obligations. Forcing a State to choose between 
honoring its obligations to the European Communities or to the Security 
Council may lead both the ECJ and the Security Council to reach more 
considered judgments in the future. 
The improvement of tribunals through competition need not be so  
confrontational. For example, some observers have noted that a kind of 
comity through competition, perhaps just what Slaughter hopes for, has 
developed between the ECJ and European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), which “has markedly increased the quality of Luxembourg’s 
jurisprudence, in that the latter cites and examines Strasbourg case-law 
explicitly, rather than making elliptical assertions of fundamental rights 
compliance.”145 Furthermore, the methods of analysis used by one  
tribunal might embolden another to improve its approach, particularly if 
those two tribunals compete with one another. It has been observed that 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body applies more aggressive and “stricter 
standards of judicial review compared to the more deferential ‘margin of 
appreciation’ doctrine applied by human rights courts [and that 
                                                                                                             
 144. For the Advocate General’s opinions, see Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. E.U. Council, 
et al., 2008 E.C.R. I-39; Case C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the 
E.U., et al., 2008 E.C.R. I-11. Shortly before publication of this Article, the ECJ issued 
its opinion in the joined cases and indeed agreed with the Advocate General’s opinion 
that the municipal effects of the Security Council’s resolution must comply with EU hu-
man rights standards. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l 
Found. v. Council of the E.U., et al., ¶¶ 285–330 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML. The ECJ’s 
reference to the case law of the ECHR should be noted. Id. 
 145. Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, 
6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 129 (2006). It is to be noted that the ECJ sits in Luxembourg and 
the ECHR sits in Strasbourg. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
http://curia.europa.edu/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); European Court of Human Rights, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
2008] COMPETITION AND COMITY 143 
c]ompeting jurisdictions among courts . . . may contribute to improving 
the quality and overall consistency of judicial reasoning.”146 
Indeed, Upendra Baxi has written about the failure of arbitration panels 
to consider human rights issues in reaching decisions,147 but this criticism 
could be an argument in favor of more competition among tribunals. The 
argument would proceed as follows: if a matter were settled by an arbi-
tration panel that ignored human rights issues, that settlement should not 
preclude another competing court from pronouncing a judgment on the 
human rights aspects of the same matter. This lack of preclusion might 
discourage parties from excluding human rights matters from the arbitra-
tion panel’s competence, since those matters might be dealt with by 
another court in the future anyway. Thus, the decision itself would con-
sider the entirety of the legal issues at stake and might present a better 
chance of compliance. 
Competition might also make for better courts in and of themselves. 
Increased comity, as a solution, may sacrifice the benefits of self-
contained regimes to realize a kind of unobtainable desired coherence in 
international law. However, courts do a better job of improvement when 
they themselves are the agents of change. Many have noted that “most 
international judicial bodies operate in ‘splendid isolation,’ . . . with  
little, if any, regard for the jurisprudence of other international tribun-
als.”148 Judge Guillaume has observed, though, that “[e]very judicial 
body tends—whether or not consciously—to assess its value by refer-
ence to the frequency with which it is seised.”149 David Kennedy has also 
remarked that “the Court is one cultural and political institution among 
others, crafting its decision to enhance its legitimacy and pull towards 
compliance.”150 Accordingly, losing work to competing tribunals might 
suggest to a tribunal that it should improve. Although strictly writing 
about international commercial arbitration, Yves Dezalay and Bryant 
Garth’s observation has relevance here: 
Competition among key actors and groups . . . serves to construct legal 
legitimacy[;] . . . the competitive battles that take place within it are 
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fought in symbolic terms among moral entrepreneurs. Battles fought  
. . . build careers and markets for those who are successful in this com-
petition, and they build the legitimacy and credibility of international 
legal practices and international institutions.151 
In support of this observation, Dezalay and Garth cite as an example 
the waning of the dispute market presence that the International Chamber 
of Commerce once offered to new arbitral institutions seeking to attract 
disputants as clients.152 It has also been mentioned that the continuing 
Doha reassessment by the Member States—that is, their reassessment of 
the effectiveness of the WTO DSU—is likely to strengthen the tribun-
al.153 
Turning to the diversity of tribunals, this diversity permits parties to 
select the tribunal most likely to produce a certain outcome because of 
the application of certain norms. This diversity is also beneficial in that it 
permits parties to select a tribunal more insulated from undesirable poli-
tics or corruption.154 Accordingly, the fairness of tribunals is oft-cited as 
a reason that some States prefer ADR.155 
In a similar manner, another benefit of competition might be increased 
transparency.156 Competition provides an incentive to produce decisions 
that will be followed,157 and thus, gives courts an incentive to be per-
ceived as fair. It is frequently noted that the ICJ decision in Nicaragua 
may have been mostly to blame for the U.S. backlash against the court.158 
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Since state compliance is still dependent on state cooperation,159 States 
may be more inclined to comply with judgments that are reached by 
courts perceived as fair. Similarly, in the context of arbitration, Christo-
pher Drahozal has argued that “[c]ompetition to be selected by parties 
gives arbitrators a stronger incentive than public court judges to enforce 
the provisions of the parties’ contract, including the parties’ contractual 
choice of law.”160 Drahozal suggests that such reasoning might also be 
applicable to courts.161 Accordingly, competition, transparency, and the 
need for decisions that spur compliance with the law might motivate  
tribunals to develop in a fair and noncorrupt way. International constitu-
tionalization and the comity proposals of Pauwelyn and Shany may not 
offer this benefit. 
In fact, attempting to constitutionalize international courts might ignite 
an even more combative fragmentation among tribunals. For example, 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Joyce Tong argue that the Westphalian project 
was essentially one aimed at destroying hierarchies and establishing  
horizontal equality.162 Indeed, managing legal tensions with conflict rules 
that require comity might place certain tribunals or their norms in a more 
vertical position; this postion might actually increase intertribunal hostili-
ty,163 and any friendliness that Slaughter sees among horizontal tribunals 
might be lost. States exercising their sovereign prerogatives might gravi-
tate to more ad hoc, bilateral tribunals that apply alternative equitable 
solutions rather than solutions drawn from the strict corpus of interna-
tional law, all of which will generate even more conflicting international 
norms. Failure to embrace decentralized norm building might exacerbate 
the fragmentation of international law, which frustrates advocates of a 
constitutionalized, international legal system.  
In addition to better tribunals and better decisions, increased competi-
tion could make for better justice. For example, if a particular tribunal 
becomes more popular, is this not an endorsement by the parties that they 
regard the court as achieving justice? Judge Guillaume finds the in-
creased competition among courts as a risk that “[could lead c]ertain 
courts . . . to tailor their decisions so as to encourage a growth in their 
caseload, to the detriment of a more objective approach to justice. Such a 
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development would be profoundly damaging to international justice.”164 
Bruno Simma has also noted that “the exclusion or modification through 
a ‘self-contained regime’ of ‘normal’ secondary rules [could lead] to a 
‘softening’ of the legal consequences of wrongful acts.”165 But if compe-
tition may produce more carefully crafted decisions—decisions largely 
perceived as fair and more accurately reflective of the law made by 
States for States—then is this development not in pursuit of justice?  
CONCLUSION  
In short, the fears of fragmentation may be overstated. First, there are 
forces opposing fragmentation such as interjudicial dialogue, common 
legal traditions, and harmonization, as well the application of many of 
the same rules of general international law.166 Second, any threat to legal 
certainty posed by fragmentation does not appear particularly graver in 
the modern era than any preceding time period. These kinds of conflicts 
are simply part of the nature of the international legal system.167 That 
being said, competition may, in fact, produce better norms. Drahozal has 
stated that “[t]he more choices of national law available to parties, the 
more likely they can find a national law that they prefer. Indeed, . . . con-
tractual choice of law facilitates interjurisdictional competition, thereby 
further enhancing the choices available to the parties.”168 Fragmenting 
norms could provide opportunities for better norms, particularly since 
differing legal traditions bring differing norms to adjudication, all of 
which may have their relative strengths.169 In support of this, Nicolaïdis 
and Tong cite to the competition between the United States and EU 
countries to export their legal models, as well as the diversity in the legal 
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models in Europe, which instills a normative power in these models.170 
This continual updating of law and legal dispute resolution is healthy for 
the law to maintain legitimacy while keeping up with social change.171 
How popular courts weigh the need for equality, the right to a hearing, 
and so on might suggest a balance among principles that is the most just 
approach. Other tribunals may look to the decisions of more popular fora 
as examples of justice, and reform themselves and their image appro-
priately.  
Changes in the substance of the law brought about by conflicts of 
norms and jurisdiction can be beneficial. Some academics have written 
about the evolution of certain rules due to competition for business, such 
as the role of party autonomy.172 Others have discussed the criticism 
made in regards to tribunals’ applications of comity rules designed to 
resolve conflicts.173 In addition, according to Petersmann, “The rule-
oriented WTO dispute settlement system [has been cited as mitigating] 
power disparities in international relations.”174  
Thus, increased competition may increase the diversity of legal norms 
and the legitimacy of the norms applied. As William Burke-White has 
articulated, the interaction of fragmenting and antifragmenting trends 
produces a pluralist legal order, which is more open to a variety of alter-
native norms.175 The attractiveness of this theory is that there is an inter-
national legal system that is legitimate and effective because it strikes a 
balance between diversity and universality.176 This diversity of legal 
norms “can be a source of normative power.”177 As the ILC has  
observed, “Even as international law’s diversification may threaten its 
coherence, it does this by increasing its responsiveness to the regulatory 
context.”178 
Any objection to the beneficial role of fragmentation is based on one’s 
conception of justice and whether justice can be a democratic and com-
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petitive preference. If the South West Africa cases179 at first lost work for, 
and then later brought work back to, the ICJ, then the latter decisions in 
this series can be regarded in one of two ways: merely a play  
for prestige, or a constructive acknowledgement that the international 
community thought that its prior decisions were wrong and did not do 
justice. With the deliberate adoption of the more purposive interpretation 
method described by Dugard,180 the ICJ may be seen as reforming itself 
in order to better execute justice, notwithstanding the critical remarks of 
South Africa’s ad hoc judge in the final South West Africa case regarding 
the justice achieved.181 Prior ICJ decisions had led some developing 
countries to view the court as a failure, and prefer the establishment of 
new dispute settlement tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea.182 Perhaps the recent increase in business for the ICJ 
shows that countries now regard the court as just, striking a balance  
between, on the one hand, the interests of States in retaining the role of 
sovereign consent in international law and, on the other hand, the inter-
national community’s need to constrain States’ freedom of action. 
Of course, the opposite can be easily argued: justice is not popular. 
However, if international tribunals are created by States in order to do 
justice among them, then being recognized as the “most attractive” fo-
rum is evidence that a particular tribunal may have a better appreciation 
for justice. Petersmann has argued that “national and international courts 
do not yet constitute a coherent legal and judicial system,”183 the word 
“coherent” being used in the sense of a single, legitimate, norm-
producing system without internal inconsistencies. However, is this not a 
form of coherence if a system allows the best court, norm, or justice to 
survive? Fragmentation may not be a problem to be solved, but rather, a 
sign that the international legal system needs to consider a variety of le-
gal norms.184 As society’s definition of justice evolves, so do many  
tribunals, not necessarily towards a top-down, constitutionalized, hierar-
chical system overseeing a coherent, unitary international legal order, or 
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for that matter towards a network of friendly, lending, and borrowing 
professionals. Instead, they may affirm a bottom-up, vigorous system 
where different legal actors compete for the best realization of justice.  
 
